on necessities including food and clothing, assume debt, and spend savings. [5] [6] [7] [8] Prior studies have illustrated variation in breast cancer health care expenditures across regions and centers in the United States. 9 , 10 Yet an exclusive focus on regional variation can mask substantial differences at the local level, 11 as individual health status and disease characteristics affect treatment choices that providers make with their patients, and patient and physician preferences play a role in determining spending as well. Variation between patients and between providers within local areas is not well understood.
Understanding the level and drivers of variation in spending within geographic areas is important to developing and targeting policies to increase the affordability and value of cancer care. Some spending variation will be due to patient-level treatment differences, even when the outcomes are comparable. For example, the choice of mastectomy over breast-conserving surgery-which have comparable patient outcomes in early stage breast cancer 12, 13 -has been shown to lower overall costs because of the decreased need for adjuvant radiation. 14, 15 Other differences in practice patterns between physicians, such as the use of staging investigations or higher cost radiation treatment techniques, can also increase expenditures. 16, 17 The level of within-region spending variation and the extent that it is explained by between-patient or between-physician differences informs whether policy should target physician-patient level decisionmaking, vs physician or system-level change. Moreover, because there is significant variation in health care spending throughout the breast cancer trajectory, 18 distinguishing the factors that drive variation in spending in the first year after diagnosis from those in the last year of life may aid efforts to reduce cost and improve care.
To provide a more granular understanding of the key drivers of spending for patients with breast cancer and to inform policies aiming to improve the value of care, we analyzed between-patient and between-physician variation in medical spending within geographic regions during the first year following a breast cancer diagnosis and,
for those who died of breast cancer, in their final year of life. We then examined how much of the between-patient and betweenprovider spending variation was explained by characteristics of the patient, of the patient's cancer, or by cancer treatment modalities received. Finally, to understand residual differences across physicians, we examined differences in intensity of care between high vs low spending physicians.
| DATA AND ME THODS

| Data
We used the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)- We excluded a small number of patients living in Hospital Referral
Regions (HRRs) with fewer than 10 breast cancer patients, as it was not feasible to estimate empirical models within this small sample size. Our final study sample included 20 818 women. Details on sample exclusions are available in Table S1 .
For each woman in our sample, we selected claims corresponding to the initial 12 months following diagnosis and termed this period the "initial phase." For patients who died during the study period, we selected claims corresponding to the last 12 months of life, termed the "end-of-life phase". When a patient died <24 months after diagnosis, we assigned the last 12 months to the end-of-life phase and any remaining months to the initial phase. The end-of-life phase analysis excluded patients who had a cause of death other than breast cancer.
| Study variables
Our primary outcome was total medical spending per patient per month, defined as the per person sum of total allowed amounts across all Medicare claims files, except for outpatient pharmacy (Part D), in each month. We excluded outpatient pharmacy claims, because they were missing for patients not enrolled in a Part D prescription drug plan (46% of our study sample). Total medical spending was measured for the initial month of the patient's diagnosis and all subsequent months. To lessen the influence of outliers, all observations with total medical spending above the 99th percentile were set to the value of the 99th percentile.
Medicare spending is determined using a common fee schedule with adjustments primarily for geographic differences in input and practice costs. 20, 21 We controlled for these geographic adjustments in payment, so that Medicare payments could be used as a resourceweighted measure of utilization. We attributed each patient to the Hospital Referral Region (HRR) where the patient received the plurality of her care and controlled for this geographic variation using HRR fixed effects in all analyses. As a result, residual differences in spending reflect differences in resource utilization within regions and not differences in fees.
Patients were also attributed to the physician most responsible for directing the patient's breast cancer care, which we defined as the surgeon or medical oncologist from whom she received the plurality of her care. Physician attribution for the initial phase of care and end-of-life phase of care was separate, and the attributed physician in the initial (end-of-life) phase was the surgeon or medical oncologist associated with a claim on more days during the initial ( 
| Analysis of variation in spending
Assessment of the contribution of differences between patients and differences between physicians to the variance in total spending was estimated using multi level regression models with individual patient and individual physician random effects:
where Spend measures total spending per patient i, physician p, and For each phase of care, we calculate the proportion of variation in spending due to patient and physician components as the proportion that the variation explained by that component represents of total variance:
where c ∊ (ip, p) and ̂2 c is estimated from (1). Since total variation (i.e, the denominator in (2)) is large in this population, we also report the standard deviation in spending for each component, which can be interpreted as the predicted additional spending for patients or physicians with spending one standard deviation above the mean: Each of these sequential models produced a revised estimate of the component-specific variance ̃2 c (e.g, for both patient and physician components), which measures the component-driven variation in spending not associated with the added covariates. We thus calculate and report the proportion of component-specific variance that is explained by added covariates:
| Factors
Output from all models is presented in the Appendix S1.
| Cancer treatment intensity
Variance in spending explained by between-physician differences, but not associated with the covariates in (4), (e.g, ̃2 p ), may be associated with intensity within cancer treatment choices or other services that reflect physician behavior. Our final analyses assessed whether
greater intensity of cancer care was associated with higher spending physicians. We used the multi-level models in (4) to estimate predicted physician average per patient spending that was adjusted for differences in patient demographic and disease characteristics, provision of cancer treatment modalities, and time and region fixed effects. This adjusted average per patient spending was estimated separately for each phase of care.
We then sorted physicians into quintiles based on this adjusted average per patient spending and examined differences in utilization and spending outcomes associated with quintiles using linear regression:
Outcomes were measures of treatment intensity and included inpatient utilization (average patient days per month), office visits (number per month), imaging (number of patient days with an imaging procedure excluding those to identify stage), hospice (patient days), chemotherapy spending, and Herceptin spending for patients with HER2 + disease. We only measured use of Herceptin and not use of other biologic drugs, because 91% of claims for Biologic drugs were for Herceptin. We include Quintile, a linear term that measures the quintile of the patient's physician, to test for trend in utilization and spending outcomes across quintiles. Standard errors were clustered on physician. Differences in treatment intensity by physician quintile were estimated separately for the initial year following diagnosis and for patients being treated in the last year of life. All outcomes were measured per month, except for days in hospice which was measured per patient. We report results as predicted values based on these regressions; additional methodologic detail included in the Appendix S1.
| RE SULTS
The study cohort included 20 818 women with a diagnosis of breast cancer. The average age at diagnosis was 76 years, 13.1% of the sample was non-white, and 81.5% of the sample had a Charlson comorbidity index score of 0 or 1. At diagnosis, 94.5% had Stage 1-3 disease and 5.5% had Stage 4 disease; 9.6% of patients had documented HER2 + disease. Detailed sample characteristics are presented in Table S2 . 
| Analysis of variation in spending
During the initial year following diagnosis, average monthly spending for patients was $2966 (standard deviation $4418) ( Table 1) .
Between-patient differences explained 14% of the variation in total spending (i.e, %Var i = 14%), while between-physician differences explained 4% of spending variation (i.e, %Var ip = 4%). To put these percentages into context, we estimated that a patient with monthly spending one standard deviation greater than average spent an additional $1538, while a physician at one standard deviation above average spent $845 more per patient than average.
In the last year of life, average monthly spending per patient was $5768 (standard deviation $9613). Between-patient differences explained 11% of variation in spending (i.e, %Var i = 11%), and between-physician differences explained 1% of variation in spending (i.e, %Var ip = 1%). The standard deviation of between-patient and between-physician spending was $2946 and $862, respectively. Controlling for patient demographic and disease characteristics, provision of cancer treatment modalities drove 31% of between-physician variation in spending in the year following diagnosis, but did not drive any of the variation in spending explained by between-physician differences in the last year of life. Receipt of cancer treatment at a NCCN center or teaching facility explained 8% of between-physician variation in spending for patients at the end-of-life.
| Cancer treatment Intensity
A considerable proportion of the between-physician variance in spending was not driven by observed patient/disease characteristics or by cancer treatment modalities (Figure 3 , right-side panel). Table 2 presents results from our analysis of whether this residual between-physician variation, ̃2 p , was associated with cancer-related treatment intensity. In the first year following diagnosis (top panel of Table 2 ), predicted monthly spending for patients with the same observed disease characteristics and cancer treatment modalities was 70% higher for physicians in the highest vs lowest spending quintile ($4115 vs $2418, respectively, P < 0.001). One of the largest differences in treatment intensity across quintiles was the number of inpatient days. High spending physicians had patients with more inpatient days (77% more for quintile 5; 38% more for quintile 4) than physicians in the lowest spending quintile treating similar patients. Among patients who had chemotherapy in the initial phase, physicians in the two highest spending quintiles were associated with 45%-54% greater chemotherapy spending than physicians in the lowest spending quintile treating similar patients.
In the final year of life (bottom panel of Table 2 ), predicted monthly spending for patients associated with physicians in the highest spending quintile was 2.36 times greater than for patients associated with physicians in the lowest spending quintile ($11 783 vs $3506, P < 0.001). Among patients receiving any chemotherapy, physicians in the highest quintile were associated with chemotherapy spending that was over two times as Physicians in the highest spending quintile were also associated with 73% more office visits, 73% more non-staging imaging scans, over twice as many inpatient hospital days per month, and greater use of hospice than physicians in the lowest spending quintile.
There were no significant differences across quintiles in spending on radiation or Herceptin.
Results from sensitivity analyses that included women in the end-of-life phase who could only be attributed to a primary care physician were similar to the main results (Table S7 ).
| D ISCUSS I ON
This paper finds evidence of considerable variation in resource use for patients with breast cancer living in the same geographic region and with similar demographic and clinical characteristics-in both the first year following diagnosis and the last year of life. Although betweenpatient spending variation is greater than between-physician variation, between-physician variation is important, as the highest spending physicians were associated with 70% more monthly spending per patient during the initial year following diagnosis and with 243% more F I G U R E 3 Determinants of between-patients and between-physician variation in spending* [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Note: Each bar represents the variation in spending due to the component in that phase of care, so the left-most bar is variation in spending due to between-patient differences in the initial 12 months post diagnosis. Results based on regression models of patient monthly spending on patient and provider random effects and indicators for time variables (month of phase and calendar quarter), the HRR where patients received the plurality of their care, and that sequentially add patient and disease characteristics, indicators for treatments received, and indicator for any care received at a teaching hospital or NCCN center. Model results presented in Tables S5 and S6 monthly spending during the last year of life than physicians with the lowest spending. This finding contributes to an emerging literature showing large spending variation within local areas. 11, 24 Understanding the drivers of this variation is needed, so that policy levers can be targeted to reduce inefficiencies in local-level heterogeneity. Our results suggest that in the first year following diagnosis, some of the observed variation in spending betweenphysicians is because different types of patients choose to go to different physicians or that physicians specialize in the care of different types of disease, as half of the between-physician variation is driven by patient sorting by demographic/disease characteristics. In contrast, the majority of spending variation due to between-patient differences and of spending variation due to between-physician differences at the end-of-life were largely unexplained by differences in patient demographic/disease characteristics, indicating that patients with similar characteristics are receiving different cancer treatments.
Choices among cancer treatment modalities explained nearly half of between-patient spending variation in the first year after diagnosis and nearly one-third at the end-of-life. A key question is whether spending variation is appropriate or inappropriate.
Appropriate spending variation may be driven by unobservable patient preferences, such as when there is choice between breastconserving surgery and mastectomy, or clinical uncertainty, such as at the end-of-life when there is the least evidence to guide decisionmaking. 25, 26 Other clinical factors, such as whether patients have a BRCA mutation or whether the cancer disease progresses/recurs soon after initial diagnosis, are unobservable in our data and may also lead to appropriate differences in cancer treatment. While higher spending in higher-intensity settings can be a driver of inappropriate spending (i.e, due to supplier-induced demand), we found that treatment at a teaching or NCCN hospital only explained 8% of variation in spending between-physician for patients at the end-oflife, and almost no spending variation otherwise. Patient surveys to determining the mechanisms associated with variation in care and whether it is appropriate is a critical area for future research. 27 Binary choices to offer treatment modalities do not explain significant between-physician variation, but the intensity of treatment within these binary treatment choices is also an important component of physician decision-making. We find differences in intensity of use of inpatient hospitalization and chemotherapy for all patients, which suggests that there is variation in physician decision-making about treatment (e.g, which agents to use) for similar patients, even where there are prescribed clinical pathways for treatment. We also find considerable variation in intensity of treatment between-physicians for many other services for patients at the end-of-life, a finding that in other work has been found to be associated with physician beliefs. 28 Interestingly, among patients with any hospice care at the end-of-life, higher spending physicians also demonstrated greater spending for hospice services than lower spending physicians. This pattern of care, where use of hospice did not offset more intensive treatment, has also been observed for women with ovarian cancer. 29 This analysis can inform efforts to promote appropriate decisionmaking for physicians with their patients and increase value in cancer care. Payment reforms aimed at changing incentives regarding treatment decision-making (e.g, episode-based payment), should target choice of chemotherapy drug regimens and utilization of inpatient hospitalization.
Our results also suggest that policy efforts to reduce unwarranted variation should also be directed at physician-patient interactions. Cancer care pathways, which are evidence-based treatment protocols for patients with specific disease types and stages, could allow patients to better understand the cost consequences of their treatment choices and could help to minimize variation in treatment between patients. 30 Decision support for physicians and decision aids for patients could facilitate these difficult conversations regarding treatment choices.
The design and adoption of such interventions may be spurred by the advent of payment reforms for cancer care, such as the Oncology Care Model being tested by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation and in the private sector. 31 However, initiatives to reduce variation in cancer spending are not without risks. 32 It will be critical to monitor access to care, quality of care, and patient outcomes to ensure that changes in treatment patterns eliminate the provision of lowvalue care and while preserving spending that is beneficial to patients.
This study has several limitations. Our sample is limited to elderly women with fee-for-service Medicare, so the findings may not generalize to younger women with breast cancer. The sample included in the end-of-life models is small due to the small number of women dying of breast cancer in the short time frame of the study. We did not have data on physician characteristics (e.g, age and tenure of service), and due to the limited sample and the complex nature of how physicians practice across hospitals, we were unable to explore whether between-physician differences are driven by facility characteristics. Finally, the results are not reflective of practice pattern changes since the study period included the launch of new therapeutics (e.g, Perjeta, Kadcyla, etc.). As expected, a substantial degree of the observed spending variation is not explained by observable patient or physician factors, which is expected and consistent with other examinations of cancer in the literature. 33, 34 There is extensive variation in medical spending for patients with breast cancer, both in the first year following the diagnosis and at the end-of-life. Interventions to reduce unwarranted variation in health care spending for cancer care are critical to improving value, clinical outcomes, and patient well-being. Results from this analysis suggest that interventions targeting the decisions of physicians with their patients about treatment planning, and in particular physician decisions about specific chemotherapy regimens, are opportunities to reduce variation in spending and to increase the affordability and value of cancer care. 
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